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Abstract: We identify pertinent institutions governing the structure of payoffs with regard to female 
career progression. Drawing on recent insights in behavioral economics, we hypothesize that interac-
tions between psychological mechanisms and the institutional setup may be important determinants of 
cross-country differences in the level and evolution of female representation in executive positions in 
the business sector. We test this proposition informally by exploring whether it can be used to account 
for some of the observed differences between the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries in this 
respect. Two particularly important conclusions emerge: (i) broad welfare state policy promotes high 
female labor force participation, but blunts incentives to pursue top executive positions in the business 
sector; and (ii) psychological mechanisms are likely to amplify the effects of policies and institutions. 
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th century witnessed dramatic changes in the economic situation of women across 
developed economies in the West. Only two or three generations ago, most women were 
restricted to low-paying occupations with bleak career prospects. In recent years the share of 
women in higher-paying professions previously dominated by men has risen substantially. 
Today, women’s labor force participation is comparable to men’s; women have the same or 
higher levels of education and have largely bridged the pay gap for comparable work. In a 
parallel development the share of women holding positions of power in the political sphere 
has increased dramatically.  
 
In contrast to these developments, female representations in some key sectors of the labor 
market have hardly changed in the last century. One particularly conspicuous area is top 
management of large firms. Female CEOs constitute, for instance, only 2.4 percent of all 
CEOs of the Fortune 500 companies in the US, and only 1 percent of all listed companies in 
Sweden (Catalyst 2007a, Renstig 2006). Why have there been broad and consistent advances 
for women in top positions in politics and the public sector, but not in this sector? Given the 
symbolic (and real) importance of CEOs and their top management teams as a commanding 
height, the lack of female representation has by many observers been interpreted as a signal 
that women are still widely discriminated against in society (see, e.g., Black and Strahan 
2001, Goldin and Rouse 2000, and Altonji and Blank 1999). Adding to this puzzle is another 
– on the surface surprising – pattern, the fact (as will be shown) that female underrepresenta-
tion amongst managers is greater in Scandinavian countries, where gender equality has been 
promoted most heavily than in Anglo-Saxon societies with a more laissez faire attitude to-
wards this issue (Hakim 2000, 2004, Mandel and Semyonov 2006).  
 
Why is this the case? We examine whether differences in policies and institutions across 
countries can further our understanding of the patterns of differences, particularly the low 
share of women in top corporate positions. While addressing institutional and policy differ-
ences, we will also suggest a somewhat novel mechanism to explain the phenomenon, namely 
psychologically induced path dependence in career trajectories. Incentive structures include 
both a monetary and a non-monetary element, and are influenced by norms and habits. We 
emphasize further that norms and habits are not set in stone but also tend to be endogenous, 
i.e., the consequence of policies and institutions (see, e.g., Lindbeck et al. 1999). We consider 
preferences, and internal payoff structures, as mutable and affected both by factors such as 
time allocation and the external payoff structure (Bowles 1998).  
  1 
The purpose of this paper is thus twofold: (i) to identify pertinent institutions governing the 
structure of payoffs with regard to female career choices and aspirations; (ii) to study the 
interaction and feedback of payoffs with the formation of norms and institutions – formal and 
informal – and consider issues such as the path dependence of career progression. This in-
volves an exploration of psychological mechanisms that may amplify these effects, in a set-
ting where preferences are treated as malleable and endogenous. We particularly focus on 
data from Sweden and the United States, both because of the availability of data and because 
they constitute the strongest contrasts in the exercise. These two countries are situated at 
opposite ends of the policy spectrum as regards the degree of state involvement in the econo-
my (Freeman et al. 1997), and in the family (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).  
 
There are a few studies examining the effects of path dependence on career progression. Arun 
et al. (2004) investigate how different kinds of career breaks affect the subsequent working 
lives of women. They find that long child-related breaks induce the largest income penalties, 
lead to a loss of status and seniority, and reduce the probability that women return to the same 
type of job as before. Light and Ureta (1995) and Sewell et al. (1980) argue that the potential 
of the first job is an important determinant of subsequent career success. Furthermore, career 
planning can to some extent explain actual work behavior. Hakim (2004) finds that women 
who make the most realistic career plans and acquire the needed skills succeed best in the 
labor market. These women were also found to represent a rather inelastic labor supply, simi-
lar to that of men. Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen (2006) and Albrecht et al. (1999) find 
that temporary career withdrawals (partial or complete) result in women accumulating less 
experience, which lowers the likelihood of future promotion.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the empirical evidence of the current 
situation in Scandinavia and Anglo-Saxon countries. There exists no clear set of indicators of 
career progression, and we therefore present different measures where comparable data are 
available. In the next section the possible outcomes of different institutions are analyzed. This 
includes an exploratory empirical evaluation of the expected effects through a comparison of 
the situation and recent development in the two country groups, with special emphasis on the 
US and Sweden. In the third section we suggest a number of psychological mechanisms 
which, by inducing path dependence, are likely to be important for both the initial career 
choice and the subsequent evolution of career aspirations and performance, thereby reinforc-
  2ing the behavioral effects induced by the institutional setup. The main focus is on fertility. 
Both the extent of markets and the role of other institutions (or lack thereof) are important 
components of how agents interact, and consequently on how outcomes are determined. We 
therefore relate the psychological mechanisms to the institutions, in an attempt to explain the 
empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes. 
 
The Facts  
 
The Anglo-Saxon countries (here the US, the UK, Canada and Australia) and Scandinavia 
(here Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland) constitute reasonably distinct institutional 
settings, even if there are also substantial differences across countries within the two groups. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have the smallest degree of government involvement in 
the economy among advanced nations, with the Scandinavian countries having the largest. On 
the other hand both groups have high levels of female participation in the labor market com-
pared to the rest of the world.  
 
In table 1, we summarize comparable female indicators of career progression together with 
some basic economic measures between these groups. As can be seen in the table, both groups 
have about the same female participation in the labor market, with Scandinavia somewhat 
higher than the Anglo-Saxons. The groups also have high and similar incomes per capita, with 
important exceptions of especially high incomes in the US and oil-rich Norway. A marked 
contrast is that Scandinavian countries have more than double the share of female members of 
legislative bodies, while Anglo-Saxon countries have a higher share of females in managerial 
positions.  
 
To an outside observer it may seem paradoxical that women in Sweden (and to a slightly 
lesser extent in other Nordic countries) are so successful in obtaining top political positions 
both in an absolute sense and relative to the U.S. Is that because Swedish political careers are 
less time consuming and less competitive? If not, the arguments put forward regarding institu-
tional and psychological barriers to Swedish business executives would be weakened. How-
ever, as documented by Freidenvall (2008) and Sainsbury (2004) the explosive development 
of female representation on political positions can be largely attributed to the gendering of 
democracy, which resulted in the introduction of voluntary quotas in virtually all parties. 
Once entrenched this principle became a binding norm resulting in a close to 50 percent fe-
  3male share of parliamentarians and a 40–50 percent share of female Cabinet ministers since 
1994.
1 This principle has then spread to management positions in the public sector, and by 
2006 58 percent of all public sector managers were women, compared to a mere 23 percent in 
the private sector (Statistics Sweden 2008, 106).  
 






































Anglo-Saxon  18.0 40.8 51.5  15.0  413.7  41,500  36.6 
   Australia  26.7 37.1 39.4  27.0  20.8  34,700  35.3 
   Canada  21.3 36.9 50.9  18.0  32.6  35,900  40.0 
   UK  19.5 34.0 40.2  25.4  60.7  34,400  43.6 
   US  16.8 42.7 54.7  11.8  299.7  44,000  34.9 
             
Scandinavia  41.8 29.7 55.3  15.9  24.5  38,000  53.4 
   Sweden  47.0 31.6 57.3  13.3 9.1  34,100  56.6 
   Finland  41.5 28.6 57.7  10.1 5.3  33,300  50.5 
   Denmark  38.0 27.7 54.6  18.8 5.4  36,000  53.5 
   Norway  36.1 31.6 49.3  24.2 4.7  53,100  50.2 
Source: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm, OECD in Figures 2007 (data for 2006), OECD Labor Market 
Database, ILO (Laborsta) and Eurostat (LFS). 
Note: “Managerial positions” refer to ISCO-88 group 1, i.e., legislators, senior officials and managers. Public 
share of the economy refers to the average value of public revenues and public expenditures as a share of GDP. 
 
The relatively high share of female participation, as depicted in table 1, has evolved only 
during the last century. The 20
th century entailed far-reaching changes in women’s overall 
autonomy, including opportunities in the labor market. Goldin (2004) describes how in the 
US in the 20
th century there were five different successive cohorts of college graduate women, 
each having different opportunities and responding to different institutional settings. Her 
analysis shows how women’s preferences in terms of occupation, family formation and eco-
nomic independence changed during this time period. Every consecutive cohort succeeded 
better than the previous one. Large changes also occurred in Western Europe including Swe-
den. 
 
Until the 1970s, women were essentially unrepresented on executive positions in the Swedish 
business community, whereas the corresponding representation of women in the US was then 
                                                 
1 See Freidenvall et al. (2006) for an analysis of the mechanisms behind this development. 
  4already expanding. Table 2 presents the share of women in intermediate and higher executive 
positions in the private sector for a few industrialized countries (governed by data availabil-
ity). Table 2 also includes public sector executives in the figures, which tends to inflate the 
Swedish share. Sweden not only falls behind Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the 
UK but also other large continental European countries such as (West) Germany and France. 
Among the countries compared, Sweden clearly comes out at the bottom.  
 
Table 2  Share of women on executive positions
‡ in selected countries in the mid 1970s (%). 
 Year Share
France 1975 16.3





‡ Refers to intermediate executive positions and higher. 
Source: Asplund (1984). 
 
Despite Sweden’s reputation for its ambitious policies of gender equality, recent data suggest 
that Sweden is not a leading country concerning female representation in managerial posi-
tions, neither in the world nor within the EU. Within the EU, France today has the highest 
share of women (about 37 percent) whereas Austria has the lowest (27 percent), as can be 
seen in table 3. Sweden holds an intermediate position just below the EU average at 32 per-
cent. Table 3 also includes politicians and managers in the public sector, an area in terms of 
female representation where Sweden has been world leading. Still, Sweden significantly trails 
the corresponding US figure of 42.7 percent, which is approximately 35 percent higher.  
 
The foregoing comparisons were all made using data on managers in a broad sense, which are 
comparable, up-to-date and easily available from international sources. If, however, we nar-
row our definition of managers to include solely chief executives and directors, it becomes far 
more difficult to find suitable data. Nevertheless, the available limited data show that in 2005 
in Sweden the share of CEOs among men was 5.4 times higher than among women. This is 
one of the highest figures in the EU (EU-15); higher figures are found only in Denmark, the 
UK and Portugal. The corresponding US figure is about 2.5, i.e., it is more than twice as 
  5common to be a female CEO in the US as in Sweden. Even then, of course, they are a minori-
ty – in the US only about 25 percent of all chief executives are women.
2  
 
Table 3  Share of women holding managerial positions in the EU and the US in 1997 and 
2007 (%). 
Country 1997 2007   Country  1997  2007 
Belgium 30.2 33.8   Austria  28.2  26.7 
Denmark 23.7 27.7   Portugal  32.8  31.5 
Germany 26.6 28.9   Finland  22.7  28.6 
Ireland 30.0 30.9   Sweden  27.0  31.6 
Greece 22.0 27.9   United  Kingdom  33.8  34.4 
Spain 31.1 32.0   Norway  26.9  31.6 
France 33.9 37.9   Switzerland  20.1  30.4 
Italy 17.0 33.5   US  n.a.  42.7 
Netherlands  21.1 28.0   EU 15 (average)  29.6  32.7 
Source: Eurostat (LFS) and ILO (Laborsta). 
Note: “Managerial positions” refer to ISCO-88 group 1, i.e., legislators, senior officials and managers. 
 
Hence, when we focus on the top managers the difference between the US and Sweden seems 
to be even larger. When it comes to the evolution of women in corporate officer positions, the 
trend has been upward in most developed countries. This is also true for Sweden, where re-
presentation has increased sharply over the last few years, in particular during the 1990s 
(Henrekson 2004, ch. 2). Since then, however, the share of women in corporate officer posi-
tions in listed Swedish firms (see table 4) has remained relatively low, with a marginal rise 
from 10.6 percent in 2001 to 12.3 percent in 2005. The corresponding figure in the US for the 
Fortune 500 companies (F500) was 16.4 percent in 2005 (Catalyst 2006), a somewhat higher 




                                                 
2 The Swedish figure is taken from LFS, Eurostat and the US figure from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. There 
may be a slight difference in the definition of the categories compared.  
3 The female CEO share among all firms is about ten times higher (25 percent) than the F500 share (2.4 percent) 
in the US. Thus, focusing exclusively on the F500 share probably underestimates the US female share. Unfortu-
nately, we have not found any other comparable data concerning corporate officer positions.  
  6Table 4  Women on corporate officer positions in Swedish listed companies, 1990, 2001 and 
2005. 
 1990 2001  2005
No. of women on corporate officer positions  20 178  246
No. of corporate officers  733 1,674  1,996
Share of female corporate officers (%)  2.7 10.6  12.3
No. of companies with female corporate officers  17 108 151
Share of companies with female corporate officers (%)  10.1 43.2 55.7
Note: The share of female corporate officers can be compared with the US F500 figures: 8.7 (1995), 15.7 (2002) 
and 16.4 (2005). 
Source: Renstig (2006). 
 
All data have hitherto shown that the Anglo-Saxon countries in general and the US in particu-
lar have a higher share than Sweden of women in leading positions. However, there is one 
exception to this pattern which must be pointed out. Particularly in Scandinavia, there are 
either laws mandating a certain female percentage on corporate boards, or there are continual 
threats from politicians to pass such legislation. In Norway, for example, from January 2008 
40 percent of all corporate board seats of state-owned or publicly listed companies must be 
held by women. This political pressure is distinctly evident in the distributions of gender 
measured by official statistics. Table 5 reports the female share of corporate board members 
in Europe, the US and Canada. It is clear that the Scandinavian countries in general and Nor-
way in particular have a much higher share of women on corporate boards.
4  
 
Table 5  Female share of corporate board members, 2008 (%). 
 
Country   Country   
Belgium 7.0   Portugal 0.8 
Denmark 18.1   Finland  25.7 
Germany 7.8   Sweden  26.9 
Ireland 10.1   United  Kingdom  11.5 
Greece 6.0   Norway  44.2 
Spain 6.6   Switzerland  6.6 
France 7.6   Canada  2007  13.0 
Italy 2.1   US  2007  14.8 
Netherlands 12.3   EU  15  9.7 
Austria 9.2      
Note: The figures from US and Canada are based on the 500 largest companies whereas the EU figures are based 
on the 300 largest companies. 
Source: Catalyst (2007b), Catalyst (2008) and European Professional Women’s Network (2008). 
 
                                                 
4 The female share of corporate board members was invariably below 5 percent through the 1990s. In the face of 
a threat of legislation, the share more than doubled in 2003 to 12 percent (Petrelius Karlberg 2003). 
  7It should be stressed that patterns identified for CEOs and managers are also likely to emerge 
in many other occupations and areas such as finance, management, legal and technical con-
sulting, portfolio management, and top-level academic positions, all requiring the acquisition 
of highly specialized human capital. Such jobs tend to be characterized by non-divisibilities 
and non-convex production functions over an extended interval (a boss working 12 hours a 
day cannot be replaced by two people working six hours).
5 Thus, female corporate board 
representation taken in isolation is likely to be misleading as a proxy for female executive 
career influence and opportunities. 
 
Policies and Institutions 
 
It is often tempting to attribute cross-country differences to the nebulous and all-
encompassing concept of “culture”. While culture is certainly important, our aim is to explain 
as much as possible through specific differences in policy and institutional setup.
6 In contrast 
to culture-based explanations, this approach can offer useful policy guidance. It is also justi-
fied by the fact that the assumption of cultural differences requires hair-splitting, inasmuch as 
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries have very similar cultural attitudes regarding the 
role of women (Inglehart and Norris 2003, ch. 2).  
 
Undoubtedly, numerous institutional factors impacting on female career choice and career 
success cannot be mapped with theoretical or quantitative precision. Instead we do our best to 
achieve the best possible tradeoff among the often ambiguous institutional factors that we 
deem relevant enough for framing the questions posed. In what follows we mainly focus on 
the US vs. Sweden. These two countries are the most clear-cut representatives of the two 
groups, and it would also be too demanding in terms of space to delve deeply into the institu-
tional details for every country in table 1. 
 
Parental Leave  
 
A key issue in the analysis of the share of women in top positions is fertility, and the extent to 
which the institutional setup is conducive to combining career aspirations with childbearing 
                                                 
5 See Rosen (1983) and Romer (1990) for persuasive arguments regarding the importance of indivisibilities and 
non-convexities for productivity at the individual and aggregate level. 
6 The importance of institutions for the understanding of female labor supply is also highlighted by Gurgand 
(2005). 
  8and childrearing. There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the speeds of ca-
reer progression begin to diverge between men and women after the birth of the first child 
(see, for example, Browning 1992, and Flood and Gråsjö 1997). Harkness and Waldfogel 




During the first period of a child’s life the caregiver is most often one of the parents, typically 
the mother. Previously, women had to either give up their careers completely, or take long 
breaks following the birth of their first child. When more and more women entered the labor 
force during and after World War II, the need to make it possible for women to take some 
time off while pregnant and then in the first period after childbirth became increasingly ob-
vious. Today, most countries have some kind of legislated rights for parental leave, albeit 
with considerable heterogeneity with respect to length and compensation levels, and still in 
many cases the right is granted to the mother only. 
 
Sweden in 1955 introduced three months of parental leave with some compensation. Original-
ly, all rights accrued solely to the mother. During the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the scheme became 
gender-neutral and it was gradually extended. Today, Swedish parents share 480 days, of 
which 60 days are reserved for each. The compensation level is 80 percent (up to a cap) of the 
income level attained during the year preceding the birth of the child. Employers are prohi-
bited from refusing a parent’s claim to days off for parental leave. Women who work are 
guaranteed the possibility of returning to their job after having given birth. Generous systems 
also facilitate women’s work when the child is older (Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communications 2001). The Swedish system is flexible in the sense that it enables parents to 
combine part-time leave with work. Legislation also offers opportunities for unpaid planned 
leave, and up to 25 percent work-time reductions until the youngest child turns eight.  
 
In the US, on the contrary, there existed no federal legislation concerning parental leave until 
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was introduced in 1993. Previously, there had only 
been some state-level legislation and occasional private agreements. The latter was rare: only 
three percent of the employees had agreements with their employees concerning paid parental 
leave when FMLA was introduced (Ruhm 1997). FMLA provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid 
                                                 
7 The “family gap” implies that women with children have lower wages than women without children. 
  9leave within a period of 12 months. Furthermore, FMLA only covers workers who have 
worked at least 1,250 hours for the same employer during the last 12 months. It covers all 
government workers independent of workplace size, but only private employees in establish-
ments with at least 50 employees. 
 
A cursory glance at the empirical literature suggests that the introduction of the parental leave 
system has had solely positive effects on women’s career opportunities and their labor supply. 
Ruhm (1998) confirms the proposed hypothesis in a cross-country comparison of nine devel-
oped countries, where the introduction of a short period (three months) of paid parental leave 
was found to be associated with a 3–4 percent increase of the female labor supply, and the 
corresponding increase was 4 percent for a longer period (nine months). The introduction of 
paid parental leave (especially if compensation is calculated as a share of the wage level 
immediately before the birth of the child) raises rates of women’s return to work, especially 
during the prenatal years, which in turn boosts female labor force participation and the overall 
labor supply (Albrecht et al.1999). The positive effects of a paid parental leave system for 
women predominate – more women can and do continue to participate in the labor market. 
Consequently, in this circumstance they tend to experience a smaller loss of human capital 
than they did when having children was associated with lengthy or even permanent interrup-
tions in their labor market participation. Generous systems are moreover likely to give rise to 
high fertility rates, since it lowers the cost of children (Björklund 2006).  
 
However, for career-oriented women there are also dramatic negative effects of introducing 
paid parental leave, especially if the scheme is generous. In all countries, women take the 
larger part of the parental leave. Even when the parental leave benefit is paid by the state and 
thus is not a direct expense, there are great indirect costs for the employer. All women run the 
risk of paying these costs through statistical discrimination, regardless of whether they have 
children and regardless of whether they intend to use all rights to parental leave. They are 
discriminated against simply because employers making hiring decisions under uncertainty 
use the sex of an individual as information about his or her qualities.
8 Thus, beyond a certain 
threshold, it is quite conceivable that the more generous the insurance, the more (statistical) 
discrimination. As a consequence, women risk getting lower wages, less attractive positions 
                                                 
8 Blau and Kahn (2000) discuss employers’ possible reluctance to hiring women because of the risk of not 
reaping the expected return as a result of a greater probability that a woman will be facing more difficult tra-
deoffs between competing demands from professional and family duties. See also the discussion in Mandel and 
Semyonov (2006), and Meyersson and Petersen (2006). 
  10and less opportunity for on-the-job learning and firm-specific training. Hakim (2004) con-
cludes that the focus on family-friendly policies (to increase birth rates) in the Nordic coun-
tries have impacted negatively on gender equality in the labor market.  
 
Ruhm (1998) shows that the total positive effects are greatest for paid parental schemes of 
shorter duration. When the right to leave is prolonged, the positive effect diminishes and the 
effect on women’s wages ends up being negative. The latter effect can be due to both in-
creased costs for the employer during longer spells of absence and increased supply of women 
in the labor market as a result of the scheme. Generous parental leave schemes induce women 
to take longer leaves than otherwise. Moreover, one would expect the effects of statistical 
discrimination to be the greatest for those positions where the learning period is long, the 
learning costs are high, the employer’s loss in case of absence is great and the tasks cannot be 
postponed (Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen 2006). These characteristics are typical and 




Child Care  
 
Child care is another important factor that enables women to combine participation in the 
labor market with having children. The extent of the support is important, and so is the degree 
to which it is tailored to the needs of career couples or of the average household. 
 
In Sweden, the rate of subsidization for public child care is exceptionally high (Rosen 1997). 
It has also increased substantially since the introduction of a price ceiling in 2002. For fami-
lies with more than one child in public child care, the degree of subsidization (2008) invaria-
bly exceeds 90 percent. This has had an enormous impact on parental choice; practically all 
families where both parents work or study use public child care (Armbruster et al. 2003). The 
reduction of the maximum fee can also explain roughly half of the increase in fertility for 
households with children of pre-school age in the early 2000s (Mörk et al. 2009). 
 
                                                 
9 The expansion in the parental leave entitlement in the US has, according to Ruhm (2004) had little effect on 
female employment rates. As a European contrast, a German study by Ejrnaes and Kunze (2006) shows that a 
longer maximum duration of parental leave in Germany has a negative effect on both employment and wage 
outcomes. Another European study based on Austrian conditions in the 1990s shows, however, that a prolonged 
duration of parental leave did not affect re-entry wages nor had detrimental effects on the career path (Lalive and 
Zweimüller 2007). 
  11Although the rate of subsidization is very high the flexibility is low. Child care centers are 
only open on weekdays, normally close between 4.30 and 5 p.m., and they are closed for 
planning and vacation a substantial number of days per year. Career-oriented women may 
demand services during more unconventional hours, which are not provided by the public 
system, and hence must resort to private unsubsidized alternatives or complements. In those 
cases where publicly provided child care is subsidized relative to more tailored forms of child 
care, career-oriented women are likely to be disadvantaged.  
 
In the US, the state has chosen to give incentives to the provision of private child care. This 
includes numerous and sometimes very generous tax reductions. Direct subsidies are less and 
less common, and mainly come in the form of refundable tax allowances. However, the sup-
port is generally reduced at higher family income levels. Examples of support schemes are 
those for child care, which recently have been raised, for care of family members and for 
employer-provided dependent care.
10 The US support schemes are thus more flexible in the 
sense that the service in question can be more easily tailored to the particular needs of a fami-
ly without it running the risk of becoming illegible for support.  
 
The net effect is that the heavy subsidies to public child care should encourage women’s 
participation at lower and medium career levels, but the impact on the top-earning women is 
likely to be less pronounced or negligible (through lack of more tailor-made systems).
11 It can 
be interesting to note that care of children was not among the activities “outsourced” in the 
US and that high-earning women with kids spend a similar amount of time per child. The 




Household Services and Personal Taxation 
 
It is reasonable to hypothesize that high personal taxes tend to have a more inhibiting effect 
on women than men in terms of career advancement. For reasons largely related to the pattern 
of specialization that emerges after the birth of the first child, women tend to accumulate a 
                                                 
10 It is possible to receive tax-free care for up to USD 5,000 paid by the employer (Internal Revenue Service 
2004). 
11 Cf. Albrecht et al. (2003) who claim that the Swedish day-care system and parental leave policy encourage 
women to participate in the labor force at the same time as the generous system may discourage strong career 
commitments. 
12 See American Time Use Survey, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm. 
  12comparative advantage in performing some forms of household work (Becker 1985). Survey 
evidence also shows that women perceive that the distribution of total household work be-
comes less equal once the first child is born (Gershuny 2000; Hakim 2004). Men also tend to 
do unpaid work where professionals have higher productivity, while women to a high degree 
perform those household tasks where there are at most only small productivity gains when 
performed by a professional.
13  
 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) describe the women’s movement during the 1960s and 1970s as 
being very successful in altering our perceptions about what women were and were not ex-
pected to do. This was an important prerequisite for establishing the norm that women should 
work full time and participate in the labor market to the same extent as men. However, ac-
cording to the authors, there was no corresponding change in the perception of what men 
should do besides paid work. Thus, women still do most of the household work (Hakim 2004; 
Blau 1998). Table 6 gives an overview of the gender difference between paid and unpaid 
work in Sweden, the US and Europe.
14 
 
Attaining and maintaining a position from which power can be wielded requires – besides 
talent, competence and motivation – time or mental space. An individual has about 14 hours 
per day at her disposal to spend on work, breaks and work-related travels and leisure.
15 
Göransson (2004) finds that top managerial positions in large Swedish firms demand 10–13 
working hours per day. Thus, no more than approximately 1–4 hours is left for work-related 
travels and household work. Insofar as unpaid household work is time demanding, it can be of 
great interest for women – since they still perform the lion’s share of household chores – that 
it is both possible and perceived to be economically rational to buy services, releasing time 
from household work in order to make it easier to combine family and career.
16  
                                                 
13 This is only true as long as the service is performed in the household in the same way as the woman would 
have done. It does not include services like dry cleaning, take-away food or restaurant visits, where specialized 
capital equipment is used and where there are likely to be economies of scale.  
14 Rothstein (2005) suggests a self-reinforcing process in the division of household work and wage labor be-
tween married couples resulting from “asymmetric mate selection”. Women tend to marry men who are a few 
years older and therefore have a stronger labor market position. As a result, it appears rational after childbirth 
that the husband specializes more on market work to maximize family income. Thus, even if there were no 
differences between the spouses at the age when they first entered the labor market, large differences can accu-
mulate over time.  
15 Out of 24 hours, around nine are spent on personal care such as sleeping, washing, dressing and medical care, 
and about one hour is spent on meals (Gershuny 2000). Similarly, Juster and Stafford (1991) find that these 
factors correspond to approximately 10 hours per day in industrialized countries. 
16 There is in general a negative relation between wages and the level of household work (Hersch and Stratton 
1997, 2000). Bonke et al. (2005) studying Denmark, a country very similar to Sweden in terms of compressed 
  13 
Table 6  Paid and unpaid work in Sweden, the US and Europe, latest available year. 
 Sweden  US  Europe* 
Share market work all men–women  59–41  60–40  65–35 
Share home production all men–women  40–60  36–64  32–68 
Share market work married/cohabitant men–women  61–39  66–34   
Share home production married/cohabitant men–women  38–62  33–67   
*Weighted average for Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Swe-
den, Norway, Finland, Slovenia, and Belgium 
 
Hours per year 20–74  Women  Work Home Children 
Sweden 2000–01  Sweden  1,050 1,180 180 
US 2005  US  1,230 1,120 250 
 Men   
Sweden 2000–01  Sweden  1,530 810 100 
US 2005  US  1,810 660 105 
Sources: OECD in Figures 2007 (data for 2006), OECD Labor Market Database, AUTS 2005, and Eurostat 
Standardized Time Use Survey. 
 
American women in the top 25 percent of the (total) income distribution tend to work more 
than Swedish women, roughly 2,000 hours p.a. compared to 1,700 hours p.a. This difference 
is similar to the difference between Swedish and American men in the corresponding catego-
ries, who work 2,000 and 2,400 hours p.a., respectively. But this can nevertheless explain 
why Swedish women may be at a disadvantage when it comes to job categories characterized 
by non-divisibilities and requiring high effort. High-earning Swedish women spend signifi-
cantly more time in personal care and leisure than their American counterparts. However, 
about one third of the difference is explained by more hours worked in production of home 
services (not including care of children, on which Swedish women spend less time). American 
women earning more than 250,000 dollars per year work over 2,600 hours p.a., and spend 
only some 1,000 hours doing household work (compared to 1,500 hours for all working-age 
American women), including one third fewer hours spent on care of children.  
 
Hence, the purchase of personal household services facilitates for women who attain and keep 
top executive positions, and is likely to be important. When such services are provided in the 
market, more time and effort can be allocated to the professional career. When the female 
labor market participation rate increases, one would expect a vibrant market for household 
                                                                                                                                                          
wage structure and high taxes, find mixed results. However, the authors find the flexibility of housework to have 
a considerably larger penalizing effect on wages, especially for women and especially those at the 90
th quantile. 
  14services to develop. However, the most salient factor determining to what extent a market for 
household services develops is the total tax burden on labor. When all cost is labor cost, it is 
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H C  = “do-it-yourself” cost in household production (foregone after-tax wages). 
M C  = cost of buying the service in the market from a professional supplier (foregone ex-
penditures on other consumption goods). 
B W  = buyer’s pre-tax wage per unit of time. 
P W  = pre-tax wage of the professional supplier. 
B H  = time required to accomplish the task by the buyer. 
P H  = time required to accomplish the task by the professional. 
t = marginal tax rate on the buyer’s labor income. 
s = payroll tax rate levied on employers. 
m = valued-added tax (VAT) rate or sales tax rate. 
 
Expression (1) states that market provision dominates when the professional’s comparative 
advantage – his relative productivity times the relative wage – exceeds the tax factor, 
) 1 (





. Thus, the comparative advantage ratio determines task assignment and thus 
time allocation. However, taxes alter private choices by changing the threshold comparative 
advantage ratio at which market provision dominates. High taxes on labor make it unprofita-
ble for people to buy household services. This induces agents to allocate more time to unpaid 
(and hence untaxed) household work, and less time to a professional career.
17  
 
The Swedish tax factor was until recently in the interval 2.7–4.0, whereas in the US it is in the 
range 1.3–1.9. The Swedish situation implied that to finance an hour of household work by 
purchasing it directly from a professional, the individual needed an hourly wage roughly 4 
times higher than that of the employed worker. Such an hourly wage corresponds to a 
monthly salary that is actually higher than the average salary of CEOs of incorporated firms 
(Statistics Sweden 2007). Thus, it has very rarely been economically rational for Swedish 
career-oriented women to buy in any large measure such professional household services.  
 
                                                 
17 Based on cross-country regressions Davis and Henrekson (2005) find that higher tax rates on labor income and 
consumption induce people to allocate less time in the labor market and more time to household work (the 
shadow economy also gets larger). Olovsson (2009) obtains similar results. 
  15More generally, Swedish wage dispersion is extremely narrow from an international perspec-
tive, not only compared to the US but also compared to virtually all rich countries. A narrow 
wage dispersion, combined with progressive taxation reduces the incentives to trade prefe-
rences for monetary rewards. An example of such preferences, regardless of the source of the 
preference itself, is to break away from traditional gender patterns, and thereby start self-
reinforcing processes as laid out in the next section.
18  
 
Hence, the high Swedish tax factor (combined with a narrow wage dispersion) encouraged 
people to perform more household tasks themselves rather than relying on market provision. 
Swedish women have therefore been induced to allocate their time so as to participate in the 
labor force, whereas the incentives to work long hours and strive for a steep career progres-
sion became weak (Jonung and Persson 1993).  
 
The real effects of the high costs of household services have also been amplified by a widely 
held social norm against buying household services. The norms against such outsourcing have 
included ideas about “rich” women exploiting “poor” women (or underprivileged immigrant 
women). It has also been seen as offering an unfair means for men to escape demands for 
within-household equality, i.e. sharing the household work evenly (see, e.g., Florin et al. 
1999). 
 
All these factors may help us to explain why the increased participation rate of women in the 
US labor market in the 1960s, to a greater extent than in Sweden, paved the way for compre-
hensive marketization of household services, despite the more rapid increase in female partic-
ipation rates in Sweden. The average number of hours worked for US women of working age 
increased by 40 percent between 1975 and 1994. Measured in this way, female employment 
in the US reached the level in Sweden already in the 1970s (Jonung and Persson 1993). This 
process occurred despite the massive expansion in public sector employment in Sweden, 
which increased the demand for female employment due to the fact that the expansion in-
volved predominantly “female” occupations. Furthermore, the increased public sector em-
                                                 
18 Albrecht et al. (2003) also state that the relatively high wages at the bottom of the wage distribution makes it 
hard for career-oriented woman to hire professional household service providers. They also document that 
women’s wages in Sweden fall behind men’s wages more at the top of the wage distribution. Furthermore, Black 
and Strahan (2001) and Black and Brainerd (2002) find that increased competition in a sector improves female 
wages due to a decrease in firms’ ability to discriminate. 
  16ployment involved greater subsidies for child care and elderly care, work traditionally per-
formed (predominantly) by women in the home.  
 
Cortes and Tessada (2008) show that highly educated women in the US increased their labor 
supply when the price of household services went down as a result of low-skilled immigra-
tion. They find that the flow of low-skilled immigrants in the 1990s led to another 20 to 30 
minutes at work each week for women with a professional degree, an MBA, or a PhD. At the 
same time, such women decreased the time they spent on household work and reported in-
creased spending on such services. 
 
The Swedish problem with expensive household services could be mitigated by specifically 
designed deductions and selective subsidies. Such systems are common in many other Euro-
pean countries, e.g., Denmark (until 2004), Finland and France. Since the 1
st of July 2007 the 
Swedish government has followed these examples and introduced a tax reduction system 
which formally allows tax deductions with up to 50 percent of expenses for domestic house-
hold related services (up to a reasonably high cap).  
 
In table 7 the maximum tax factor – with and without tax deductions – for some countries are 
presented. As can be seen from the table, Sweden has had the highest tax factor among the 
presented countries without considering the tax deduction. With the tax deductions Sweden 
now has a tax factor at almost the same level as other Scandinavian countries and the US. 
This may influence the household service sector in the future and make it easier for women to 
strive for management positions.  
 
Table 7  Maximum tax factor in selected countries. 
   
Tax factor 
Tax factor after tax 
deductibility* 
Denmark   3.4 1.7‡ 
Finland  3.6 1.4 
France 3.2  1.6 
Germany  2.6  
Sweden  4.0 2.0 
UK  2.2  
US  1.9  
*when applicable; ‡until 2004.  
Source: Henrekson (2004) and own calculations. 
  17Note: Germany, the UK and the US do not have any tax subsidy system.  
 
The Time Profile of Executive Careers 
 
We have stressed that career interruptions or decelerations are likely to have long-term effects 
on eventual career success. Still, a partial alleviation of this effect may be achieved through a 
prolongation of the professional career, i.e., a postponement of the actual retirement age.  
 
In the US the average retirement age was 64 for both men and women in 1998 (Social Securi-
ty Administration 2004). The retirement age has been increasing for some time. Moreover, the 
share of older women working increases with the educational level (Hill 2002). The lowest 
age to receive full social security benefits is currently 65, but legislation has been passed that 
will gradually raise this age to 67 by 2022. The increase in benefits after age 65 is gradually 
becoming actuarially fair by 2008, which thus gives strong incentives and opportunities to 
delay retirement (see, for example, Gruber and Wise 2007). 
 
In Sweden, evidence suggests that institutions and norms have weakened incentives both for 
individuals and for (potential) employers to extend their professional career during the post-
war period (see, for example, Ds 2002:10, and Bohlin and Gidehag 2002). The tendency to 
exit the labor market earlier is not a new phenomenon. A broad spectrum of factors intervene 
to create this postwar effect: labor market legislation, wage-setting institutions, in some cases 
a disproportionally large retirement undertaking for the last employer, a corporate tax code 
that favors pre-retirement bailouts of older workers, very high marginal effects (sometimes 
100 percent) for those with low retirement benefits etc. Attitudes have adjusted to incentives, 
so when asked it turns out that people generally look unfavorably upon the prospect of ex-
tending their career. The Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication (Ds 
2002:10) reports in their inquiry on labor market obstacles for older people from the begin-
ning of the millennium that less than 10 percent want to work until age 65. On average, 
people would like to retire before turning 60. Moreover, in Sweden, as in many other Euro-
pean countries, disability programs and special unemployment programs work essentially as 
early retirement benefits. Comparing men on disability benefits aged 64 in the US and in 
Sweden, the respective numbers are 7 and 37 percent (Gruber and Wise 1999). 
 
During the postwar period there seems to have evolved a clear norm in Sweden governing 
what is regarded as an appropriate time path of an executive career. This is likely to be one 
  18reason contributing to women’s difficulties to recover lost time and opportunities after having 
given birth and interrupted or temporarily downsized their career.
19 In reality, it has also 
become increasingly common that top-level executives terminate their executive careers fairly 
young (typically around age 55). Related to this process, a compensation system has evolved 
consisting of lifelong pensions with a high replacement rate. Thus, large part (or even the 
main part) of total top-level compensation is paid out after the executive career is finished. 
 
This model of career evolution is likely to better suit men than women. Career-oriented wom-
en seem more reluctant to hand over the personal care of their kin especially their children, in 
order to boost their careers. Career paths characterized by a low retirement age and weak 
incentives to work after that age act as an impediment for women who have downsized their 
careers temporarily and would prefer to accelerate later.  
 
However, the mandatory retirement age was recently increased from 65 to 67, and the average 
effective retirement age has actually slowly increased in Sweden in recent years and was in 
2004 about 63 (Swedish Social Insurance Agency 2006). These recent changes may, if they 
persist, facilitate for Swedish women in the future. A more open-minded view of at what age 
an individual is best suited to be a top executive may increase their opportunities to find an 
optimal trajectory for their entire career.  
 
The Psychological Dynamics of Career Aspirations and Career Success  
 
The analysis in the previous section showed that the Scandinavian system tends to favor the 
average woman, while it has some negative effects for high-achieving women in the business 
sector. This is not to say that institutions alone are sufficient to explain the underrepresenta-
tion of women in either type of system. In this section we will see that the interaction of for-
mal institutions with important psychological mechanisms may give rise to path dependence. 
Moreover, incentives depend on an individual’s own preferences with respect to the external 
                                                 
19 Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) show that it is mainly during the age interval 30–45 that women’s career 
progression is flatter. The lagging behind which arises is rarely recovered by women in a later phase. See also 
Albrecht et al. (1999). 
  19structure of payoffs, and preferences may evolve as a result of personal experience, and hence 
may not be independent of institutions.
20  
 
Among the executive occupational group there is a great deal of “tournament” logic govern-
ing wage-setting and promotion decisions, i.e., many people compete and only a few reach the 
higher, generously remunerated levels. In tournaments small initial differences and disadvan-
tages may lead to large eventual differences in outcomes. For example, one person may pro-
gressively at each stage get the upper hand in a tournament because s/he is able to devote 
some more time to the assigned tasks. Analogously, given the evidence that women often 
perceive a greater conflict between work time and family time,
21 even small differences in 
this dimension may – the higher one gets in the hierarchy – lead to increasingly large differ-
ences.  
 
It is well-known from extensive research in economics and psychology, including numerous 
laboratory experiments, that women are more risk averse and less favorable towards competi-
tive environments. For instance, from experimental studies Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) 
drew the conclusion that women’s risk aversion or greater uncertainty in their ability to per-
form may well explain why they seek challenges to a lesser extent than men.
22  
 
Most women also tend to consider that it is of great importance to take care of their relatives 
(Hakim 2004). Failing in this respect often induces feelings of insufficiency and guilt. Thus, if 
a successful career requires a great reduction in time spent with your children, this is likely to 
impair women’s aspirations more. Women also seem to sometimes have difficulties in accept-
ing that someone other than the children’s father or possibly another relative serves as a re-
placement (Elvin-Nowak 1999). 
 
                                                 
20 Hakim (2000) introduces preference theory, in which women can be divided into three dominating groups in 
terms of lifestyle: adaptive, work centered or home centered. The theory identifies the heterogeneity of women 
as well as how they react to different social and economic environments. Each group’s size is thus to some 
extent endogenous, influenced by the institutional context. 
21 As described in the previous section. 
22 Other examples finding gender differences include Byrnes et al. (1999), Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2004), Croson and Gneezy (2008), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Ricciardi (2008). A recent 
study of biological differences is Apicella et al. (2008) who find that salivary testosterone and facial masculinity, 
where the latter is thought to be a proxy for pubertal androgen exposure, are significantly and positively corre-
lated with risk taking in men. 
  20However, we do not want or need to take a stand on the issue whether there are potential 
biological differences regarding issues like preferences for children and towards risk, or 
whether such differences are socially constructed. It is sufficient to note that economic poli-
cies and institutions influence behavior irrespective of how the preferences were formed in the 
first place. The gender gap in risk preferences plays a potentially important role in career 
success. The psychological mechanisms are likely to amplify the differences induced by 
policies and institutions. When designing institutions this should be taken into account. 
 
An important consequence of path dependence could be illustrated by the fact that a large 
share of US female executives remain childless because they wait too long before they try to 
get pregnant (Hewlett 2002).
23 According to Hewlett (2002), 42 percent of the high-achieving 
women aged 41–55 in the US in the business sector do not have children. Only a third of 
these women claim to be childless by choice. Among the most high-achieving women, 49 
percent are childless. The corresponding figures for American men are 25 percent and 19 
percent, respectively. The situation looks different in Sweden. Renstig and Henrekson (2004) 
find that only 12 percent of female Swedish executives aged 46–55 are childless; while the 
corresponding figure for women aged 36–46 is 19 percent. The equivalent figures for male 
Swedish executives are 11 and 16 percent. Similarly, Göransson (2004) testifies that women 
top executives in Sweden have children to the same extent as men in comparable positions; a 
pattern which clearly distinguishes the Nordic countries from Anglo-Saxon and other coun-
tries.  
 
Evidence suggests that default rules, framing effects and starting points produce or at least 
shape people’s choices (Sunstein and Thaler 2003), highlighting the importance of the design 
of both legal and organizational rules. If preferences are mutable rather than stable, choices as 
well as institutional changes may have far greater effects in the long run. There are several 
psychological mechanisms supporting this conjecture, and they are likely to be relevant in the 
context of female career choice and career success.
 24 The mechanisms that we deem most 
important and their expected effects are summarized in table 8. 
 
                                                 
23 Moreover, many of them apparently put too much trust in the pharmaceutical industry to come up with cures 
to involuntary (age-related) childlessness. 
24 See Jonung and Ståhlberg (2009) and the references contained therein. In particular, it is noteworthy that 
gender differences in preferences and talents have been shown to change as a result of the changing roles of 
women in society. See also Hyde (2005).  
  21When a great deal of time is invested in doing a certain activity, people learn to appreciate 
performing that activity, i.e., there may exist some form of adaptive preference formation. 
This, as well as a biological predisposition, may explain why career-oriented women tend to 
somewhat shift focus from career to the household after the birth of their first child. The 
psychological mechanisms presented tend to make this behavior “rational”. Women may 
discover that they in fact have preferences for this shift, once having tried it (Smith 2003). 
Just as some people learn to appreciate working as top executives; once they have given birth, 
women might well get intrinsic rewards from child rearing instead (exposure revealed prefe-
rences). If they are subject to present-biased utility, the importance of their current prefe-
rences is overrated relative to their future preferences. This can give rise to dynamic inconsis-
tency, making people allocate more time across activities according to current preferences 
than were called for by their previous plans.  
 
Table 8  Summary of psychological mechanisms likely to create path dependence in career 
progression. 
 
Mechanism Effect  Potential  impact on career path 
Adaptive preference formation:  
Learn to appreciate what we do. 
Preferences are formed in response 
to circumstances.  
(Elster 1982, Leahy and Doughney 
2006) 
Adjust preferences in response to 




Traditional household responsibilities 
are cemented; delays and obstructs 
potential career paths. 
Career advancement opportunities are 
rejected. 
Present-biased utility:  
Overrating of the present and 
melioration behavior.  
(Rabin 2002, O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 2002, Laibson 1998, 
Hernstein and Prelec 1992) 
Excess inertia: 
Tend to get stuck in whatever we do.  
Traditional household responsibilities 
are cemented; delays and obstructs 
potential career paths. 
Career advancement opportunities are 
rejected. 
Exposure revealed preferences: 
Actual preferences revealed by 
exposure to activity in question. 
(Smith 2003) 
Excess momentum: 
Adds momentum to current tenden-
cies. 
Traditional household responsibilities 
are cemented; delays and obstructs 
potential career paths. 
Reference-based utility:  
Changes more important than states. 
(e.g., Kahneman et al. 1991) 
Loss aversion/status quo bias and/or 
inclination to push on along current 
path. 
Career advancement opportunities are 
rejected. 
Representativeness bias and  
belief perseverance: 
Act based on perceived rather than 
actual probabilities.  
(Rabin 2002) 
The media image of a phenomenon 
has real effects, role models impor-
tant. 
Discourage young women, by giving 
overly pessimistic view of career 
prospects, tending to view all setbacks 
as caused by discrimination. 
 
  22All these psychological mechanisms are likely to give rise to path dependence in terms of 
occupational choice, time use, effort etc. It is thus very important to understand how the 
career path a person chooses to follow is affected by the institutional setup, and how this is 
relevant in explaining the evolution of the frequency of female executives (at various levels) 
in the business sector. It becomes important to stay “on track” at all stages in the career. There 
may, however, be an inclination to push on along current career paths as the aversion to losses 
is often greater than the valuation of foregone opportunities (reference-based utility). There 
can as well be substantial opportunity costs after experimenting with different career choices. 
A fully rational agent may therefore refrain from experimenting and stay on a non-optimal 
career track, since the time and effort required to switch to the optimal track would be per-
ceived as too great and uncertain (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000).  
 
Representativeness bias and belief perseverance can also cause problems if women believe 
their career prospects are poor and likely to remain so even when the environment is in fact 
improving. There is some evidence that women tend to underestimate their ability relative to 
men.
25 It is then of course possible that social truth becomes more a matter of convention than 
a true reflection of reality. A society may end up in a state where women underperform due to 
false beliefs and incorrect perceptions of the probabilities of success.
26 
 
The subjective probability of career success is likely to be a key factor when an individual 
decides how much time and effort to expend on career progression. If the objective probabili-
ty of success is high, but women perceive it to be small, this misjudgment will have real 
effects. Hence, when media exaggerate the obstacles for females considering a future execu-
tive career, this provides a “signal” and a negative stereotype to women, one likely to be used 
as a mental heuristic that maps a subjective low probability of success. This can and does 
obviously lead to significant and routine underperformance.  
 
                                                 
25 Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) find that men are substantially more 
overconfident about their relative performance and that that women compared to men seem to attribute positive 
outcomes more to luck than actual underlying ability. Hence, it seems reasonable to claim that women – on 
average – have lower expectations about their performance.  
26 A survey in 2005 from the Swedish white-collar trade union TCO shows that 63 percent of all female students 
think that their education will pay off, whereas the corresponding figure for male students is 76 percent. TCO 
argues that the difference is due to the occupational choice the students (are expected to) make, where females 
choose traditional “female” sectors with lower salaries and probably fewer career opportunities (TCO 2005). 
  23At least in one respect, the Scandinavian feminists’ focus on gender inequality in top posi-
tions as a result of severe discrimination and patriarchal structures may be counterproductive. 
The pessimistic view may be self-fulfilling, sapping potential female executives of enthu-
siasm and inspiration. A majority of women, even in countries with relatively high female 
employment rates, still consider themselves as secondary earners (Hakim 2004). Jobs are not 
a fundamental part of their identity, whereas employment plays a central role in shaping the 
identity of most men. On the other hand, the increasing ratio of female executives in most 
industrialized countries in the last few decades may have future positive effects. A more 
optimistic perception of the probability of success is no doubt almost certain to increase the 
relative number of career oriented women.
27 
 
Figure 1  A schematic representation of alternative career paths. 
 
Success/power 


















t0 = entry on the labor market 
tR = point of final retirement 
t1 = break point caused by childbirth or other event impacting negatively on the availability of 
time and effort expended on career development 
t2 = point when possible to revert to full career effort 
 
                                                 
27 Hakim (2004) finds that the significantly smaller female workforce in Spain is a great deal more self-selected 
than the larger female workforce in UK. A larger share of working wives in Spain considers themselves to be the 
primary (co-)earner and work centered. 
  24Consequently, one utterly critical direct implication of path dependence is that we should 
expect a greater likelihood that a person who diverts downward from his/her career path will 
not revert to the previous path again, even when this was the original intention. Figure 1 
illustrates the dual importance of striving for continuity, and avoiding “derailment”, in order 
to achieve high long-term career objectives. 
 
From the figure above it is possible to make several observations. First, depending on factors 
such as talent, motivation and education it is possible to distinguish potential career paths 
between t0 and tR, e.g., A and B.
28 Now assume that at t1 something occurs that impacts on the 
individual’s scope for expending time and effort on career development, e.g., childbirth. A 
number of things may then happen: 
a)  the person permanently gives up his/her career (this used to be very common when it 
comes to childbirth); 
b)  the professional career is completely interrupted between t1 and t2 and then resumed 
(path A
1), or 
c)  the professional career is pursued at a lower intensity between t1 and t2, and is then re-
sumed at the original pace (path A
2). 
 
However, following the above discussion, this is far from an exhaustive description of the 
potential career paths. Between t1 and t2 the level of influence/power may actually decline, 
although one may easily imagine circumstances where an individual only foregoes the 
progress that otherwise would have taken place. The individual may hence potentially resume 
her career at pre-t1 intensity at point t2. Between t1 and t2 the psychological mechanisms de-
scribed above, interacting with the institutional setting, are also likely to impact on prefe-
rences and perceptions. In the case of childbirth the period between t1 and t2 is often extended 
as a result of successive births. Even if the woman resumes working full time, career aspira-
tions may as a result be much lower or stay flat. Hence, two other possibilities remain clear 
options: 
 
d)  the professional career evolves negatively between t1 and t2 and is then resumed at a 
lower pace (path A
3), or 
                                                 
28 Discrimination (whether statistical or preference-based) may cause a difference, ceteris paribus, between men 
and women, e.g., that despite being identical in every other respect, a man may have a steeper career progres-
sion. To avoid excessive cluttering we have not included this effect in the figure. 
  25e)  the professional career evolves negatively between t1 and t2 and is then resumed with-
out progression (path A
4).  
 
There are in addition (at least) two possible ways (career paths) that can be used to catch up 
with what was forgone between t1 and t2 (these alternatives are shown as dotted lines in the 
figure): 
 
f)  at t2 the professional career evolves faster (steeper) than before t1 until the baseline 
case (A) is caught up with (A
1’), or 
g)  at tR, the expected final retirement is postponed, and the career progression continues 
until a new retirement age, tR’, is reached (A
2’). 
 
The more the individual is lagging behind between t1 and t2, the steeper the post-interruption 
career path must be, or the longer one has to postpone the final retirement age. Paths like A
1’, 
where the woman rather quickly reverts to the original career path are likely to be rare, and 
the option of putting off the point of final retirement (path A
2’) is seldom considered.
29 
 
A legislated extensive and financially generous parental leave scheme gives women incen-
tives to scale down their long-term career aspirations and allocate more time and effort to 
household work. Therefore, there might be more “negative” consequences (in terms of career 
progression) for women in countries where the state offers large subsidies to parental leave 
and grants employees unconditional statutory rights to stay home for an extended period, as in 
Sweden.
30 Dex et al. (2005) find that American women with high education have a greater 
tendency to return to work after childbirth than do their Swedish counterparts.
31 The same 
pattern is in general evident in the most recent cohorts. In 2002 Swedish women took 84 
percent of total parental leave (National Social Insurance Board 2003).  
 
As noted, a rational response by employers is to exercise statistical discrimination. Swedish 
employers reasonably know that women take some 85 percent of total parental leave, that 
there is a significant opportunity that they will work less after childbirth, and that they are also 
far more likely than a man to exercise a parent’s unconditional legal right to work part-time 
                                                 
29 Cf. footnote 18. 
30 See Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1914−1916) for a more thorough discussion of this effect. 
31 When controlling only for cohort and education. However, the results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion 
of other variables. 
  26until the youngest child turns eight. As a result, the individual woman aiming for an executive 
career is less likely to be offered a first job that puts her on a career track with great inherent 
potential (Light and Ureta 1995; Sewell et al. 1980).
32 In the US these effects are not present, 
or much weaker. 
 
In short, there are several psychological mechanisms pointing towards the great importance of 
path dependence in career choice and career success. We learn to appreciate what we do, we 
tend to overvalue the present compared to what would be rational according to a dynamic 
optimization plan; our aversion to losses is often greater than the valuation of opportunities 
foregone; our actions are determined by subjective rather than by actual probabilities; and we 
are often not aware of our real preferences until we have tried a good or an action.
33 These 
mechanisms are likely to reinforce already existing differences in the patterns of ladder climb-
ing between male and female executives and top-earning professionals, caused by direct 
mechanisms such as child bearing patterns, preferences and gender division of labor. Avoid-
ing the self-fulfilling prophecy that longer working hours and an increased career commit-





We have explored a set of policies and institutions that may help explain a basic gender dif-
ference between the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, namely the degree of represen-
tation of women on executive positions in the corporate sector: In the former there is high 
political representation yet there are few top business executives, whereas in the latter the 
inverse holds – comparatively low political representation yet many top business executives. 
A number of relevant institutions were identified that we claim to be important determinants 
of the structure of payoffs underlying both female career choice and career progression. One 
conclusion is that broad-based welfare state policies impede women’s representation in elite 
competitive positions. Furthermore, we incorporate insights from behavioral economics in 
explaining the dynamics of female career prospects. We locate and point to some likely rein-
forcing interactions between psychological mechanisms and the institutional setup.  
                                                 
32 There is an ongoing discussion in Sweden whether a completely individualized parental leave can decrease 
statistical discrimination. 
33 Studies show that women who already have a power position are equally prone as their male counterparts to 
want to keep or preserve their position (Catalyst 2004; Renstig and Henrekson 2004). 
  27 
Our analysis highlights the crucial role of the opportunity cost of making a career. This gives 
support to the view that what is particularly important for career women is the evolution of a 
market sector for services that are highly substitutable for household work. The emotional 
costs associated with a career could also be reduced if a changed time profile of the career 
was possible, and an increased career commitment did not necessarily require diminished time 
with one’s offspring. Our analysis implies a straightforward common-sense generalization: 
the best way to assure an increased presence of women in top executive positions is to make 
career paths more compatible with child rearing. This is likely to be most efficient if one 
begins to pay attention to how key institutions interact with psychological mechanisms in 
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